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Despite  the merger waves  of the  1960s and  197Os,  structural  change  in the  banking 
industry  for most  of the  forty  years  prior  to  1980 was evolutionary  in nature,  and 
consequently  the performance  of the  industry  was fairly  predictable.  Since  1980, however. 
commercial  banking  has undergone  more radical  structural change,  the most  obvious  evidence 
of which  is the  substantial  decline  in the number  of banks.  This  article  highlights  and 
describes those  changes,  providing  a point  of departure  for discussing  possible  fkure  changes 
in banking  structure. 
The  fundamental  causes  of change  in the commercial  banking  industry  are discussed  in 
the first section.  We conclude  that  two changes  in particular  have  had  a direct  impact  on 
banking  structure:  the search  for efficiencies,  and the relaxation  of  geographic  restrictions. 
The second  section  describes  structural  changes  in the number  and size distribution  of banks. 
and the ways  in which  the number  of banks  has declined  over time.  The banking  industqr  has 
far fewer, but larger banks,  now than  in  1980.  Much of the consolidation  of the  industr]l.. 
however,  was due to corporate  reorganizations  within  bank holding  companies.  The third 
section  more  fklly  explores  the  corporate  reorganization  phenomenon,  and shows trends 
toward  greater centralization  of banking  organizations  as geographic  barriers to  branching  are 
reduced. 
The fourth  section  of the paper  offers  a simple projection  of what the banking  industq. 
might  look  like  if past structural  changes  persist through  the end of the decade.  Simple 
extrapolations  of past  consolidation  trends  are developed  in order to consider  possible  chaqes 
in the number  of banks  by the beginning  of  2001.  Because the passage  of  intelstate  bmnch 
1 banking  legislation  looks  increasingly  likely,  one scenario  covering  the possible  impact  of 
interstate  branching  is also  incorporated  into the projections.  The paper concludes  by 
summarizing  what we know  about  actual  structural  changes  in commercial  banking,  and 
discusses  areas of tier  research  that  are warranted. 
I  What  Chused  Structural  Changes  in the Banking  Industry? 
A number of recent  studies  treat the causes of consolidation  as a secondary  topic 
within  the broader  issue of the  “decline”  of the banking  industry.’  In general,  these  studies 
carefully  point  out that  the  shrinkage  in the number  of banks  is not necessarily  equivalent  to a 
decline  in banking’s role  in the economy.  Nevertheless,  this  body  of work  at least  loosei!- ties 
fundamental  alterations  in the  economic  and regulatory  environment  faced by banks  to 
structural  changes. 
There  is a consensus  in this  literature  that the  major  “environmental  jolts”  experienced 
by the banking  industry  include  the  following  factors2  Bartholomew  and Mote  (199  1): Barth. 
Brumbau_&  and Litan  (1992), K~L&XUI  (1993), Rogers  (1993), Boyd  and Gertler  (1993). and 
Wheelock  (1993) argue that  competitive  pressures have  increased  from nonbanks,  and large 
corporate  borrowers  are accessing  the  credit  markets  directly  because of lower  transactions 
costs;  Boyd and Gertler  (1993), and Rogers  (1993) also discuss competition  fi-om foreign 
’ See, e.g., Kaufman  (1993),  Rogers  (1993),  Boyd  and Gertler  (1993), and Barth, Brurnbaugh.  and Litan 
(1992). The  literatux  on the  “decline” of banking  generally  takes as its starting point the decrease  in the banhing 
industry’s share of the provision  of financial  services.  7&s  research  has moved  rather rapidly  from  an assertion 
that  the  industry is in decline  (see,  e.g., Barth et al. (1992)),  to a question  about the issue (see,  e.g..  B0J.d and 
Gertler  (1993)).  Wheelock  (1993)  provides  a recent  summary  of the fundamental  causes of  change  in the 
banking  industry as they  impact  structural change.  Boyd and Graham  (199  1) deal directly  with the topic  of 
consolidation,  v&ich they  define  as “a decrease  in the number  of firms  in the induso  combined  \\irh  an ~IIUCW 
in  their  al’erage  size.” 
’  Rogers  (1993,  p. 3) coined  the term  “environmental jolts”. 
2 banks.  Boyd  and Gertler  (1993),  Rogers (1993), and Wheelock  (1993) ident@  deregulation 
of product  and geographic  restrictions  as a second fundamental  change  in the banking 
environment.  In addition,  technological  change  is mentioned  by Barth,  Brurnbaua  and Litan 
(1992), Kaufman  (1993), and Rogers  (1993), as a separate fundamental  factor  allowing 
nonbank  financial  intermediaries  to compete  more directly  with  banks.  Further, Boyd  and 
Graham (1991), Barth, Brumbaugh,  and Litan  (1992), Boyd  and Gertler  (1993), and Kaufinan 
(1993), make the point  that  the  existence  of a deposit  insurance  scheme that  is perceived  to 
institutionalize  the principle  of “too big to fail” has contributed  to structural  changes  in the 
industry  as well.3 
The more technically-oriented  research moves  f?om the kind  of far-reaching  discussion 
found  in the  “decline&ture  of the banking  industry”  literature,  to an analysis  of the  impact  of 
two particular  stimuli  for changes  in the banking  industry  (which,  at least implicitly,  are 
connected  to one or more of the  fundamental  changes  dealt with  in the  “decline/Mure” 
literature).  These stimuli  are first, the  search for improved  performance,  especially  in terms 
of efficiency  gains; and, second  the relaxation  of geographic  restrictions  on banking. 
One vein  of the performance  literature  considers  the  impact  of mergers on 
performance,  while  a second  vein  examines  the  impact  of corporate  organization  on 
performance4  Both sets of work  have  implications  for structural  change  in the industry.  The 
3 A few studies also mention  macroeconomic  factors  - inflation (Barth.  Brumbau_&  and Litan ( 1992)). 
(Wheelcck  (1993));  and government  budget deficits  (Garrison  (1993))  - as fundamental  causes of change  in the 
banking  industry. 
’  Evanoff  and Israilevich  (1991),  and Berger.  Hunter, and Timme  (1993) provide  e‘xtensive surveys  of rhe 
efficiencies  literature.  Srinivasan  (1992)  focuses  on the mergers-and-efficiencies  literature.  There  is still quite :I 
debate  on whether.  and in what respect,  mergers  improve  bank efficiencies.  DeYoung and Whalen  (I  9941 sun C’J 
the corporate  organization  and performance  literature, the conclusions  of Lthich are also open to fllrther reasoning  linking  the search  for  improvements  in performance  and banking  industry 
consolidation  runs as follows.  Heightened  competitive  pressures  compel  banks  to  search  for 
cost savings,  revenue  increases,  and/or  quality  improvements  via mergers.  Mergers  can result 
in performance  improvements  for at least two ITZEOIEL  Bank  mergers show the potential  to 
weed out  inefEciencies,  as acquiring  banks tend to be operated  more  efficiently  than  acquired 
banks.’  In addition,  within-holding  company  mergers allow  banking  companies  to  centralize 
their  operations  and, ultimately,  to change  f?om multi-bank  entities  to one-bank  entities.  This 
can improve  performance  by cutting  costs (as separate boards  of directors, regulatory  fees. 
etc. are eliminated),  and because the  one-bank  corporate  form  is less prone  to X-inefficiencies 
than  is the multi-bank  holding  company  corporate  form. 
The other main  stimulus  for the  merger wave  in banking  is the spate of recent  changes 
in state laws restricting  the  geographic  expansion  of banking.6  The reasoning  linking  the 
removal  of intrastate branching  restrictions  and banking  industry  consolidation  is twofold. 
First, mergers between untiliated  banks  allow  acquiring  banks  to extend their  reach  into 
other  geographic  markets.  Second,  lowering  legal barriers  to  intrastate  branching  has 
allowed  multi-bank  holding  companies  to merge existing  subsidiary  banks  from  different 
geographic  locations  into  one  another,  permitting  reductions  in operating  costs.  Again,  this  is 
investigation. 
5 However.  the evidence  that these  efficiencies  opportunities  are actually  captured post-merger  is spotty, 
See DeYouns  and Whalen (1994)  on this issue. 
6 Amel (1993) provides  a compendium  of  inn-a-state branching  laws.  See :11so  \‘an  Walleghem  ( 1993). 
3 desirable  because  it allows  multi-bank  orgarkztions  to move  toward  becoming  more  efficient 
one-bank  organizations. 
There  is also a logical  argument  for expecting  an increase  in consolidation  corn  more 
extensive  interstate  banking,  though  the route  is somewhat  less direct  than  for intrastate 
branching.7  Interstate  banking  laws allow  an out-of-state  bank to  acquire  a bank  in the host 
state, provided  the acquired bank  remains  a separately  chartered  subsidiary  bank,  an action 
that  by  itself  would not reduce the  number  of banks  in the system.  However,  if the acquiring 
bank  purchases  two or more banks  in a host  state which  allows  intrastate  branching,  it mi&t 
be possible  for the acquiring  bank  to merge the acquired  banks,  turning  some of them  into 
branches.  What  do the data tell  us about the nature of past consolidation  of the  industry? 
Attention  is directed  first  to changes  in the number  and size distribution  of banks. 
IL  Structural  Changes:  Banks' 
The number  of banks  dropped  by twenty-five  percent  over the  1980-1993 period:  a 
decline  consistent  with the popular  impression  of a “shrinking”  banking  industry.  However. 
as Charts  Ia and Ib illustrate,  the  decline  in the number  of banks  was not the only  signifkarx 
structural  change  in banking.  In particular,  Chart Ia shows that  the number  of bar&ing 
companies  -  bark  holding  companies  plus banks without  a holding  company  affiliation  -- 
dropped  by one-third  since  1980.  At the  same time, the number  of branches  soared  during 
7 Interstate  banking  laws generally  allow an out-of-state bank or bank holding company to operate a ~LLG  ~II 
the host state, but few states allow out-of-state  banks to fmxh  across  state  lines.  Savage (1993)  gives  a 
thorough  review  of past changes  in, and the current  state of,  interstate  banking.  Amel (1993)  lists interstate 
banking  laws on a state-by-state  basis. 
’ See Appendix  1  for a description  of the data sources  used  in this study. BankingCompanies,Banks,and  Branches 





%  10 
ii 
Y  8 
0 




JChart  Ia:  Banking  Cos.  and  Banks 
81  83  85  87  89  91  93 
1980  1981  I_982 I983  1984  1985 
BankCos.  12,368  12,200  11,960  11,685  11,385  11,047 
Banks  14,429  14,404  14,409  14,383  14,379  14,255 
Branches  37,109  38,669  40,084  41,009  41,927  43,082 
BankOffcs  49,477  50,869  52,044  52,694  53,312  54,129 
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/Chart  lb:  Branches  and  Bankina  Offices] 
80  82  84  86  88  90  92 
10,528  10,133  9,824  9,596  9,376  9,168  8,910  8,375 
14,027  13,518  12,947  12,547  12,193  11,787  11,351  10,870 
44,089  45,193  47,020  48,775  51,245  51,771  51,664  n.a. 
54,617  55,326  56,844  58,371  60,621  60,939  60,574  n.a. 
*Banks  are  all  FDIC-insured  commercial  banks.  Banking  companies  include  independent  FDIC-insured  commercial  banks,  and 
bank  holding  companies  with  FDIC-insured  commercial  banks.  Branches  include  all  offices  of  a  bank,  other  than  the  head  office, 
at  which  deposits  are  received,  checks  paid,  or  money  lent  (ATMs  and  U.S.  branches  of  foreign  banks  are  not  included).  Banking 
offlces  are  banks  plus  branches.  n.a.:  not  available. 
:;o\lrc:e  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council  (FFIEC),  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income.”  1993  data  are  preliminary the  1980s and early  1990s (Chart  Ib), rising  from 37,109 in  1980 to  51,771  in  1991, before 
dipping  slightly  in  1992.9 As a consequence,  while the number  of banks  declined 
substantially  over  the period,  the surge  in the number of branches  meant  that  the number  of 
banking  offices  -- banks plus  branches  -- actually  increased by over twenty  percent. 
Breaking  out the data by bank  size groups reveals  a distinct  pattern  to the  decline  in 
the number  of banks.  Charts IIa and IIb show that while the number  of banks  in the smallest 
size category  (i.e.,  less than  $100 million  in assets) declined  over the  entire  1980 to  1993 
period,  the  number  of banks  in every  other  size category  increased.  Another  way of viewing 
this  is that  all  of the net loss in the number  of banks over the  1980-l 993 period  was in the 
small  size category  of banks.  This  conclusion  holds  even if assets are measured  in real 
(1987) dollars,  as Charts IIIa  and IIIb  show.  Furthermore, the share  of banking  system  assets 
accounted  for by small  banks  declined  over the period,  while  asset shares  accounted  for by 
the two largest  size groups of banks  increased  (Charts IVa and I%).” 
Data on consolidation  of the  industry  can be decomposed  into  failures,  enq:  and 
mergers.”  Despite the perception  that  the number  of banks has fallen  because  so man\. have 
failed,  Chart  V shows the  importance  of mergers  in the on-going  structural  change  of the 
banking  industry.  In particular,  as Chart  V indicates,  even  in the  late  1980s  when  the 
9 The branches  data do not include Al%&  or U.S. branches and agencies  of foreign  banks.  At the time  this 
paper was written  1993 data was preliminary  and did not appear to include comprehensive  information  on bank 
branches. 
lo These  relative  shifts  in assets shares also hold when assets are measured  in constant  (19s;)  doilars. 
I’ Specifically,  the data on consolidation  show the changes in the number of  bank charters.  Hence.  mergers 
are the number  of bank charters  that disappeared  as a result of acquisitions.  ‘Wew banks” or  “IX\\ chaners” 
includes thrifts  that comzerted to banks, beginning  with the  1990 data.  For failures,  the number of FDIC-assist& 
transactions  is included even though  no charter  disappearances  are directly  associated  with them. Number  of  Banks  by  Asset  Size  Groups  (current  dollars) 
(Chart  Ila:  Banks  in  Small  Size  Groups 
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82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
_J 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  j986  1987  1988  1989  1990  299d  1992  1993 
Under  $100  mil. 12,729  12,540  12,358  12,111  11,954  11,661  11,267  10,782 10,156  9,600  9,146  8,706  8,221  7,738 
$100  mil.-$1  bil.  1,508  1,656  1,821  2,016  2,148  2,281  2,424  2,389  2,437  2,579  2,682  2,721  2,760  2,759 
$1  bil.-$10  bil. 
Over  $10  bil. 
174  186  208  233  253  286  303  311  315  325  316  311  321  319 
18  22  22  23  24  27  33  36  39  43  49  49  50  54 
Total  14,429 14,404 14,409 14,383 14,379 14,255 14,027 13,518 12,947 12,547 12,193 11,787 11,352 10,870 
i  ~~~  ---  ~~--  --  Chart  Ilb:  Banks  in  Large  Size  Groups 
._~  .___~___  ~_~  .___  ~~~~ 
I,m-M  n  -mA-m_mym-m 
/I/  ~-___-~-- 
n  $1 bit.  to  $10 bil. 
n  ..-¤’  /  I 
o Over  $10 bil. 
I 
Source FF-ItC,  “Corlsolldated  Reports  of  Condition  and income".  1993  data  are  preliminary Number  of  Banks  by  Asset  Size  Groups  (constant  dollars)* 
iChart  Illa:  Banks  in  Small  Size  Group 
:  14,  ~. 
Under  $100  mil. 
$100  mil.to  $1  bil. 
I 
80  81  a2  a3  a4  a5  a6  a7  88  a9  90  91  92  93 
IChart  Illb:  Banks  in  Large  Size  Groups 
300  I 
100 t 
m$l  bit.  to  $10  bil. 
80  ai  a2  a3  a4  a5  a6  a7  88  a9  90  91  92  93 
Asset  Size  1980  1981  3982  IS83  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  jS89  IS_90  IS91  III92  1993 
Under  $100 mil.  11,967  11,971  11,917  11,754  11,698  11,515  11,185  10,782  10,262  9,832  9,520  9,168  8,760 8296 
$100  mil.-$1  bil.  2,213  2,177  2,231  2,348  2,377  2,410  2,500  2,389  2,338  2,368  2,341  2,290  2,266  2,249 
$1  bil.-$10  bil.  226  232  236  256  277  298  309  311  310  310  292  292  289  284 
Over  $10  bil.  23  24  25  25  27  32  33  36  37  37  40  37  37  41 
Total  14,429  14,404  14,409  14,383  14,379  14,255  14,027  13,518  12,947  12,547  12,193  11,787  11,352  10,870 
*GDP  implicit  price  deflator  (1987=100)  used. 
Source  FF.lEC,  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income”  1993  data  are  preliminary. ( 
-_____- 
!Chart  IVa:  1980  Asset  Shares,  by  Bank  Size  Groups  (curr.$) 
I  (24.0%) 
‘Chart  IVb:  1993  Asset  Shares  by  Bank  Size  Groups  (curr.$)  1 
1  a Under  $100  mil. 
CI  $100  mil.-$1  bii. 
I $1  bil.-$10  bil. 
Over  $10  bil. 
Source:  FFIEC,  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income”.  1993  data  are  preliminary 
10 number  of bank  failures exceeded  200 per year, the drop in the number  of banks  was 
dominated  by  mergers.  Over the  entire  period  Tom  1980 through  1993, 5,202 banks 
disappeared  via  mergers, three  and one-half  times  the  1,456 bank  failures.‘2  Furthermore, 
Chart V makes  it clear that the merger  “wave” that began  in the  mid-1980s  continued  through 
1993, even  as the number  of bank  failures  declined  sharply.  Given  their  importance,  a closer 
look  at bank mergers  is warranted. 
Ihe  number  of bank  mergers 
really  surged after  1986.13 Chart  VI 
mergers  over the  1987-1993 period. 
increased  steadily  through  the fust  half  of the  1980s: but 
and Table I reveal  several  important  aspects of bank 
The majority  of mergers were between  banks  within  the 
same bank  holding  company  (“intra-mergers”),  but the number  of mergers between 
unaffiliated  banks  (“inter-mergers”)  has risen  over the past several  years,  surpassing  intm- 
mergers  in  1993.”  Furthermore,  as Table  I shows, most banks  disappearing  via merger  were 
small  banks  (under $100 million  in assets), and in every  size category  within-holding 
company  mergers  dominated. 
To summarize,  the data show that there was a substantial  decline  in the number  of 
banks,  and the  drop was essentially  in the  small  bank category.  Banks  over $lbillion  in 
‘* In Chart V bank failures  are defined  as BIF-insured  commercial  banks that have been closed  by their 
primary  rgulator,  or that have received  financial  assistance  from the FDIC.  This definition  excludes  savings 
banks, industrial  barks,  and uninsured  banks for which the FDIC was named receiver.  Appendix  Chart  Al  gives 
a more comprehensi1.e count,  by type  of resolution. 
‘3 Nisenson  (1991, p. 14) explains  that through  the fust  half of the  198Os, “most holding companies  operated 
the banks they  acquired  as separately  chartered  institutions”, whereas  since  1986 “holding 
companies...increasingly  consolidated  their  existing  operations  and new acquisitions  into fewer.  separately 
chartered  banks.” 
I4 A small number of mergers  could  not be identified  as either  “intra” or  “inter” due to source  data 
limitations.  Hence. the components  shown  in Chart VJ do not add to the total  for some fears. 
11 ~ -500 
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New  Charters 
Net  Change 
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 1992 1993 
128  209  258  320  332  343  340  541  598  405  379  409  438  502 
10  7  34  45  79  118  142  200  217  205  159  106  97  37 
205  197  318  354  382  310  246  212  221  196  179  128  87  68 
68  -23  29  -5  -191 -133 -223 -502 -576 -411  -355  -386 -453 -483 
Mergers:  bank  charters  that  disappeared  as  a  result  of  acquisition.  Failures:  failed  banks  include  commercial  banks  insured  by  the 
BIF  that  have  been  closed  by  their  primary  regulator  or  have  received  financial  assistance  from  the  FDIC.  New  Charter  include 
conversions  of  thrifts  to  banks,  1990-1.993.  For  some  years  net  change  differs  from  the  sum  of  the  components  because  of 
non-insured  commercial  banks  or  non-commercial  banks  converting  to  insured  commercial  banks,  insured  commercial  banks 
converting  to  non-insured  or  non-commercial  banks,  voluntary  suspensions  and  liquidations,  and  source  data  entry  errors. 
Assisted  transactions,  though  counted  as  bank  failures,  did  not  result  in  the  disappearance  of  bank  charters. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  IMS  Structure  File;  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  “Condition  and  Performance  of  Commercial 






iChart  VI:  Bank  Mergers  by  Type 
I  Intra-Mergers 
I  Inter-mergers 
87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
Intra-Mergers  346  423  278  253  266  240  237 
Percent  of  Total  64.0  70.7  68.6  66.8  65.0  54.8  47.2 
Inter-Mergers 
Percent  of  Tofal 
Total  Mergers  541  598  405  379  409  438  502 
191  169  125  120  138  189  243 
35.3  28.3  30.9  31.7  33.7  43.2  48.4 
Intra-merger:  a  merger  of  two  banks  within  the  same  bank  holding  company  that  results  in  the 
disappearance  of  one  bank  charter.  Inter-merger:  a  merger  between  two  unaffiliated  banks 
that  results  in  the  disappearance  of  one  bank  charter.  The  sum  of  Intra-mergers  plus  Inter- 
mergers  may  not  add  to  the  total  number  of  mergers  because  the  type  of  a  small  number  of 
mergers  could  not  be  identified. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  IMS  Structure  File. 
13 Bank  Asset  Size  Group  1987  l!l.f@  1989  1990  1991 
Under  $100  million  368  430  336  242  289 
Percent  of  Total  68.0  71.9  83.0  63.9  70.7 
lntra  218  289  224  154  169 
Inter  150  141  112  85  118 
$100  mil.  to  $1  bil.  157  154  60  113  103 
Percent  of  Total  29.0  25.8  14.8  29.8  25.2 
lntra  120  131  49  84  86 
Inter  37  23  11  27  14 
Over  $1  billion  7  8  6  22  13 
Percent  of  Total  1.3  1.3  1.5  5.8  3.2 
lntra  6  3  5  15  11 
Inter  1  5  1  7  2 
Total  Mergers  541  598  405  379  409 
Table  I:  Bank  Mergers  by  Asset  Size  Groups  and  Type 
Components  may  not  add  to  totals  because  the  type  of  some  mergers  could  not 
be  identified,  or  because  for  a  small  number  of  banks  financial  data  from  the  Call 















Source:  Federal  Reserve  IMS  Structure  File;  FFIEC  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Conditio 
and  Income.” 
14 assets increased  their  share of industry  assets to almost  75 percent  in  1993, up from just  over 
60 percent  in  1980.  Hence,  the general perception  that the industry  is consolidating  into 
fewer, larger banks  is accurate.  However, the number  of branches  soared,  so that  the total 
number  of banking  offices  (banks plus branches)  rose more than 20 percent  over the period. 
At the bank  level,  consolidation  was due primarily  to mergers, and within-holding  company 
mergers were the  single  most  important  component  of consolidation.  Hence,  banking 
company  structural  changes,  particularly  with  respect to  intra-merge,  and  branching,  deserve 
further attention. 
III,  !!%uctural  Clmges:  Banking  Companies 
Previous  research  and the  above bank-level  data on the pattern  of consolidation  in the 
industry  lead us to expect  a number  of changes  in the pattern  of corporate  organization  in 
banking.  First,  in light  of the fact that,  on net, consolidation  involved  the  disappearance  of 
small banks, we would  expect  a large decline  in the number of “independent  banks”  (i.e.. 
banks not belonging  to a holding  company),  which  tend to be small  in size.  In addition. 
previous  research  suggests that the choice  of corporate  organization  is a key  consideration  in 
a banking  company’s  drive  for increased  efficiency;  and that  a more centralized  organization 
that closely  approximates  a one-bank  holding  company  (OBHC) with  branches  might  be 
superior to a multi-bank  holding  company  (MBHC) with  many bank  subsidiaries.  Hence.  KC 
would  expect to see more  one-bank  holding  companies,  fewer multi-bank  holding  companies. 
and fewer banks  per multi-bank  holding  company  over time, to the extent  this  is permitted  b\- 
more liberalized  &a-state  branching  legislation.  On the other hand  because  most states 
enacted some form  of interstate  banking  legislation  over the  1980-1993 period  w  would 
15 expect to see more multi-state  multi-bank  holding  companies,  as banking  companies  took 
advantage  of increased  opportunities  to expand  geographically.  What do the data reveal? 
LILA.  Ndonwi&  Tmuh 
Charts  VIIa and VIIb  confirm  that,  over time, the number  of independent  banks has 
dwindled,  and the  asset share accounted  for by this type  of banking  company  has declined 
corrqxxxlingly.  Interestingly,  the plunge  in the number  of independent  banks  (6,562  fewer 
in  1993 compared  to  1980) was  far greater than  the total  consolidation  accounted  for by all 
failures  and mergers between  unaffiliated  banks  (approximately  3,700).”  That  is, the 
decomposition  of consolidation  does not explain  even in a proximate  sense, the huge  drop  in 
the number  of independent  banks.  By deduction,  a large percentage  of that  decline  must be 
accounted  for by acquisition  (in the Linder-Crane  senseI  ) of independent  banks  by bank 
holding  companies,  which  subsequently  retained  the  independent  banks  as separately  chartered 
entities  (else the change  would  have  shown up as a charter disappearance,  and hence  as pan 
of the consolidation  data discussed  in the previous  section);  and/or a voluntary  switch  b\r 
some independent  banks  to a bank  holding  company  form.  A large decline  in the number  of 
independent  banks  is consistent  with  expectations,  based on data presented  in the previous 
section  on the disappearance  of small  banks.  Furthermore,  Newman  and  Shrieves  (1993) 
present  evidence  that independent  banks  are less efficient  than  subsidiary  banks  of either 
I5 The  combined  figure  for  failures  and inter-mergers  over  1980-1993 is approximate  because  the distincrion 
between  inter-mergers  and in&a-mergers has not been calculated  for the  1980-1986 period.  Based  on the  I987- 
1993 period,  when that breakdown  is available,  a rough  calculation  suggests that perhaps 45 percent  of all 
mergers  over  1980- 1986 were  between  unaffiliated  banks. 
I6 Linder  and Crane (1992,  p. 36) distinguish  between  acquisitions  (“banks continue  to exist  as legal entities 
after they  are acquired  by a holding  company”)z and mergers. where  the acquired  bank ceases  to exist  as ;I 






























IOBHCs or MBHCs.  l-hat  finding  may  help  explain  the large drop in the number  of 
independent  banks,  but fkther  research  in this  vein  is warranted. 
Charts VIIIa  and VII&  fmus  attention  on several aspects of the  increase  in bank 
holding  companies.  The number  of OBHCs  increased substantially  over the period,  a 
development  in line with  the idea that  in their  drive for efficiency  banking  companies  will 
choose  a more  centralized  corporate  organization,  especially  as barriers  to branching  decline. 
However,  as Chart VIIIa shows,  the  increase  in the number  of OBHCs came  at the beginning 
of the  1980-1993 perid  ahead  of the  strong  impetus for improved  efficiencies  arising  out of 
the poor  banking  performance  in the  mid-to-late-1980s,  and before  much  of the  liberalization 
in in&a-state branching  restrictions,  which  picked  up momentum just  as the  increase  in the 
number  of OBHCs peaked.  Furthermore,  not only  did the number  of MBHCs  increase  over 
1980-l 993, but total  banking  system  assets in multi-bank  holding  companies  soared_ results 
seemingly  at odds with the eE&ncies-cum-deregulation  expectations. 
At  least part  of the explanation  for the rise in the number  of multi-bank  holding 
companies  has to do with the  distinction  between multi-bank  holding  companies  that  operate 
within  the borders  of a single  state  (one-state  multi-bank  holding  companies  - OSMBHCs), 
and those  that  own banks  in more  than  one state (multi-state  multi-bank  holding  companies  - 
MSMBHCs),  as illustrated  in Charts  IXa and IXb.  Those  charts  document  substantial 
increases  in the number  and assets  of MSMBHCs: trends  consistent  with  the relaxation  of 
barriers to  interstate  banking  that  occurred  throughout  the  1980-1993 period.  Clearly, 
analyses  of the  determinants  and paforrnance  of different  types  of corporate  organization  in 
banking  need to be mindhI  of the  distinction  behveen  multi-state  and single-state  MBHCs. 




I   I
I  OBHCs
I ~7   MBHCs
I
80 81 82 83 84 05 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
1980 1982 1982 1983 1984 1985
One-Bank Holding Companies (OBHCs)
Number 2,546 3,119 3,828 4,488 4,958 5,082
Assets (bil $) 786 914 914 613 587 567
Multi-Bank Holding Companies  (MBHCs)
Nilnitxr 340 373 439 551 724 871
Assets  (bll $) 665 731 944 1,443 1,668 1,926
Char-t  Vlllb:  Assets of Bank Holding Cos.
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
4,983 4,934 4,905 4,907 4,896 4,914 4,878 4,635
526 500 533 591 613 682 727 700
956 969 950 943 935 896 850 820
2,182 2,266 2,345 2,451 2,524 2,472 2,492 2,752
SourceFFIEC,  “Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income.” 1993 data are preliminary;Chart  IXa:  Multibank  Holding  Cos.,  By  Type 
800 
600 
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
1980  1981  1982  1983 
One-State  Multi-Bank  Holding  Companies  (OSMBHC) 
Number  324  355  418  518 
Assets  (bil.$)  580  523  671  714 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  I_992  I!!93 
671  806  856  837  807  783  764  722  673  630 
658  667  543  442  385  348  415  328  287  257 
Multi-State  Multi-Bank  Holding  Companies  (MSMBHC) 
Number  16  18  21  33  53  65  100  132  143  160  171  174  177  190 
Assets  (bll.$)  85  208  273  729  1010  1259  1639  1824  1960  2103  2109  2144  2205  2495 
)i)[lrL  -e FFIEC  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  income.”  1993  data  are  preliminary Beyond  this,  there  is evidence  on the pattern  of multi-state  expansion  by bank holding 
companies,  which  may  address  both the decline  in the number  of OSMBHCs  since the mid- 
1980s  and part of the  drop in the number  of independent  banks discussed  earlier.  As Ghan 
X shows, especially  since  the mid-198Os, banking  companies  moving  into just  one state 
besides their home  state accounted  for the vast majority  of multi-state  bank  holding 
companies.  In particular,  the number  of MSMBHCs operating  in just  two states  increased 
from  59 in  1986 to  124 in  1993.  That change  alone  could account  for more  than  one-foti 
of the decrease in the number  of OSMBHCs, as those  single-state  banking  companies  became 
two-state  banking  companies.  Furthermore, jumping  across state lines  via the  acquisition  cf a 
small  independent  bank  may have  been the route many  two-state  multi-bank  holding 
companies  chose (though,  again  little  research  has been focused  on this  issue). 
What  explains  the  increase  in the early  1980s in the number  of OSMBHCs,  a trenti 
inconsistent  with  expectations  of greater centralization  of corporate  organization?  One 
possibility  is that,  as the  liberalization  of within-state  branching  laws was being  under-t&n_ 
bank holding  companies  increased  their  acquisitions,  particularly  of small  independent  banks. 
retained  them  as separate  subsidiaries  initially,  and then  over time  consolidated  them. 
Information  in Charts  XIa and XIb is consistent  with  this  “twophase”  consolidation  stop.. 
Over the early  1980s OSIvBHCs  increased  the number  of banks under their  control  and 
subsequently,  the number  of banks per company  declined.  However,  after  1984, some  of rhc 






Type  of  MSMBHC 
S-State 
1980  1981  1982  IS83  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
9  11  14  25  41  45  59  77  81 
3  3  3  4  5  10  23  33  37 
0  0  0  0  2  4  9  10  9 
94 
3-State  36 
4-State  IO 
More  than  4-State  4  4  4  4  5  6  9  12  16  20 
Total  16  18  21  33  53  65  100  132  143  160 
i-  ~ 
_.________ 
Chart  X:  Number  of  Multi-State,  Multibank  Holding  Companies 
n 2-State 
0 3-State 
-A-  4-State 
8  More  than  4-State 










1992  1992  1993 
108  113  124 
36  35  28 
6  9  16 
24  20  22 
174  177  190 
Soilrce f-FIR,  “Conschdated  Reports of  Condition  and Income."  1993 data  are  preliminary Banks  in  Multibank  Holding  Companies 
0 
I,  1  /  I1  1  I1 
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
Chart  Xlb:  Banks  per  MBHC 
0  I  /  ,  1  1  I  1  /  I  /  1  1  .J  ..,.. 
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
1980  1981  1982  l983  1984  1985  1986  1981  1988  1989  1990  1991  I992  1993 
OSMBHC  324  355  418  518  671  806  856  837  807  783  764  722  673  630 
Banks  2,122  2,300  2,604  2,932  3,253  3,359  3,203  2,916  2,670  2,491  2,439  2,220  2,014  1,891 
Banks perCo.  6.5  6.5  6.2  5.7  4.8  4.2  3.7  3.5  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.1  3.0  3.0 
MSMBHC  16  18  21  33  53  65  .  100  132  143  160  171  174  177  190 
Banks  279  277  284  317  465  720  1,252  1,438  1,403  1,403  1,313  1,295  1,277  1,424 
Banks per  Co.  17.4  154  13.5  9.6  8.8  11.1  12.5  10.9  9.8  8.8  7.7  7.4  7.2  7.5 
:,iJilrCe  F-FlfC "Consohdated  Reports of  Condition  and Income".  1993 data  are preliminary For MSMBHCs, the  “two-phase”  consolidation  story more  closely  matches  the  facts. 
Unambiguously,  multi-state  multi-bank  holding  companies  reduced the number  of banks  per 
company,  even  as the total  number  of banks  in MSMBHCs increased.  In addition,  as Chart 
XII shows,  the number of branches  per MSMBHC rose significantly  over the  1980-1993 
period,  a development  in line with  “phase 2” of the acquisition-then-consolidation  process. l7 
Table  II provides  additional  insight  on the nature of structural  changes  in bank  holding 
companies.  In particular,  over time  a growing  share of OSMBHCs were accounted  for by 
smaller  companies.  In the early  1980s  one-third  of single-state  multi-bank  holding 
companies  were  large (i.e., over  $1 billion  in assets); but by the mid-to-late  1980s  fewer than 
fifieen  percent  were large.  Clearly,  OSMBHCs  “left” the group by merging  together,  or by 
“consolidating  up” to a OBHC  form,  or by becoming  multi-state  bank  holding  companies. 
Over time,  a growing proportion  of OSMBHCs tend to be smaller  companies,  with  fewer 
banks,  and a smaller  branching  network  than  in the past.  The implications  of this  trend  for 
community  banks have not bc addressed  elsewhere, and are beyond  the  scope  of this  paper, 
but certainly  merit  further study. 
IU.B. Evidence  at the State Level 
The review  of data on nationwide  trends  in banking  company  structures  reveals  a 
complex  story,  and one that  in part hinges  on distinctions  between  OSMBHCs  and 
MSMBHCs.  In particular,  the  question  of what form of corporate  organization  banking 
I7 As the table  below Chart XII shows, the number of branches  in banks  in MSMESHCs  soared  over  the 
1980-1993 period.  This  increase cannot  be accounted  for just  by the conversion  of  subsidiary  banks to branches. 
In fact,  it represents  entry  into the  industry  via branching.  Amel and Liang (1992)  explain  entry  via branching  in 
terms of changes  in intra-state branching  law and interstate banking law liberalization.  Clearly,  more  work  on 








/Chat-t XII: Branches per Bank, by Type of Multi-Bank Holding Co.
-
83 84
1980 1982 1982 1983
One-State Multi-Bank Holding Companies (OSMBHCs)
Branches 9,820 10,16611,241 12,086
Branches/Bank 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.1
Multi-State Multi-Bank Holding Companies  (MSMBHCs)
Branches 1,823 2,348 2,838 6,193


























Source  FFIEC, “Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income.” 1993 data are preliminaryTable  II:  Asset  Size  Distribution  of  Bank  Holding  Companies. 
Percent  of  Bank  Holding  Companies,  by  Type,  in  Asset  Size  Groups 
OBHCs 
Under  $100  mil. 
$100  mil.  -  $  ?  bil. 
$1  bil.  -  $10  bil. 





Multi-Bank  Holding  Companies: 
OSMBHCs 
Under  $100  mil.  22 
$100  mil.  -  $  1  bil.  47 
$1  bil.  -  $10  bil.  28 
I-  Over  $10  bil.  3 
7‘ 
26  28  31  35  36  36  38  36  36  33  32  31  33 
44  45  45  47  49  51  51  54  54  57  58  61  60 
27  25  22  16  14  13  IO  10  10  10  70  8  7 
3  3  2  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
MSMBHCs 
Under  $100  mil. 
$100  mil.  -  $  1  bil. 
$1  bil.  -  $10  bil. 
Over  $10  bil. 
6  6  IO  3  0  0  3  4  6  8  8  9  11  8 
25  11  0  6  8  6  10  14  17  21  29  27  25  31 
50  61  67  48  49  46  44  46  41  37  33  35  36  34 
19  22  24  42  43  48  43  36  35  35  31  29  28  27 
ml 
86  85  84  84  84  84  84  83  81  79  78  75  74 
11  13  14  14  14  14  15  16  18  20  21  23  24 
3  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1982  1985  1992 
OBHCs:  One-bank  holding  companies;  OSMBHCs:  Multibank  holding  companies  with  banks  in  one  state  only;  MSMBHCs:  Multibank  holding  companies  with 
banks  in  more  than  one  state;  Assets:  the  sum  of  assets  in  commercial  banks  owned  by  the  holding  company.  Percentages  for  each  type  of  BHC  may  not  add  to 
100  percent  due  to  independent  rounding. 
*Less  than  0.5  percent. 
Source:  FFIEC,  “Consonlidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income”.  1993  data  are  preliminary. companies  have  chosen  is complicated  by differences  in state branching  laws, differences  in 
interstate  banking  laws, and differences  in the pace at which  those  laws have  been  changed 
over the  1980- 1993 period.  One way to focus more clearly  on banking  company  choices  of 
corporate  organization  is to ask the  following  question:  Is there a difference  in choice  of 
corporate  organization  for banks  operating  in states which  have a tradition  of statewide 
branching,  compared  to those  which  have  retained,  or only  recently  relaxed,  restrictions  on 
branching?  In particular,  do we see a large and growing proportion  of banking  companies 
choosing  to  consolidate  into  more centralized  organizations  in states where  such  consolidation 
is possible?  And  in states which  have been very  restrictive  in their branching  provisions  do 
we see a greater proportion  of multi-bank  organizations? 
In order to  answer these  questions,  forty  states were divided  into three  groups  on the 
basis of their  laws on statewide  branching.18  Sixteen  states had statewide  branching  laws on 
the books prior  to  1980.  Banking  companies  in this  group of states have had  a long-standing 
opportunity  to rationalize  their  bank  and branch  networks  into a centralized  form,  and if it 
were optimal  to be a OBHC, most would  be.19 At the extreme, we would  expect  to see no 
changes  over the  1980- 1993 period  in the proportion  of one-bank  versus multi-bank 
companies.  A second  group of states, those  retaining  substantial  restrictions  on statewide 
branching  until  at least  1990, was also chosen.  Banking  companies  in these  states  have  had 
I8 Amel (1993)  sets out the status of branching  and interstate  banking  laws for all f&y  states and the 
District of Columbia  Eleven  states did not fit unambiguously  into any of the three groups  due to the timing 
and/or nature of their  changes  in branching  legislation. 
I9 DeYoung  and Whalen (1994)  raise the point that some bank holding companies  appear  to have chosen  to 
retain ho  banks, one with a national  charter.  and one with a state charter.  The issue of whether,  and ho\~. thib 
benefits a bank company  is a topic  for further  research. 
27 limited  opportunities  to consolidate  subsidiary  banks, and could be expected  to have  chosen  a 
multi-bank  form of organization.  Finally,  a group of states which  substantially  liberalized 
branching  laws during  the  1985-1988 period  was chosen.”  In these  states we would  expect to 
see a decrease  in the number  of multi-bank  companies,  and an increase  in the number  of one- 
bank  companies,  as statewide  branching  laws were enacted.  As a definitional  issue,  it is 
important  to note that,  for the purposes  of this  exercise,  “OBC” signifies  a bank  holding 
company  operating  only  one bank  in a given  state, whether  or not the  company  operates 
additional  banks  in other  states; and  “MBC” refers to a banking  company  operating  two  or 
more banks  in a given  state, regardless  of its banking  presence  in other  states.  Under  these 
conditions,  what  form of corporate  organization  have banking  companies  chosen? 
Charts  XIII% XIIIb,  and XIIIc present  rough measures of the response  of banking 
organizations  to different  branching  environments.  The most obvious  pattern  revealed  in 
those  charts  is that the number  of bank  holding  companies  operating  only  one  bank  in a given 
state rose substantially  in the  early  198Os, regardless  of branching  regimes.  This  result  is not 
anticipated  by our hypotheses,  at least  in the  case of those  states with  restrictions  on banking 
throughout  the period,  as well  as those  which  liberalized  branching  restrictions  after  1984.” 
2o Statewide  branching  prior to  1980: Alaska,  Arizona,  California,  the District of Columbia,  Delaware, 
Idaho, Maryland,  Maine, North  Carolina,  New Jersey,  New York, Nevada,  Rhode  Island,  South  Carolina,  South 
Dakota, Vermont.  States liberalizing  branching  laws in  1985-1988: Florida,  Hawaii, Nebraska,  Oregon, 
Washington,  Louisiana,  Michigan, New  Hampshire,  North  Dakota, Oklahoma,  Texas,  Virginia,  West Virginia 
Wyoming.  States with restricted  bmnching  until at least  1990: Arkansas,  Colorado,  Illinois,  Iowa.  Kentuck!,. 
Mississippi,  Missouri,  Montana, New Mexico,  Pennsylvania 
21 Huggins  (1986) discusses  “five key advantages”  to the bank holding  company  versus  the  independent 
bank form.  “Improved  management  control”  includes  aspects related to improvements  in efficiency,  but Huggins 
also discusses  advantages  related  to acquisitions,  product  expansion_ tax considerations,  and “operational 
flexibility”.  Clearly,  the huge shift toward  the OBHC  form,  regardless of the status of branching  legislation. 
deserves  further  attention. 
28 1  Chart  Xllla:  Corp.  Organization  -  States  w/Statewide  Branching  1 
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80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
States  with  statewide  branching  prior  to  1980:  Alaska,  Arizona,  California,  the  District  of  Columbia,  Delaware, 
Idaho.  Maryland,  Maine,  North  Carolina,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  Nevada,  Rhode  island,  South  Carolina,  South 
Dakota,  Vermont.  States  liberalizing  branching  laws  in  19851988:  Florida,  Hawaii,  Nebraska,  Oregon, 
Washington,  Louisiana,  Michigan,  New  Hampshire,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  Texas,  Virginia.  West  Virgrnta. 
Wyoming.  States  with  restricted  branching  until  at  least  1990:  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Issinors.  iowa,  Kentucky, 
Mrssrssippi,  Missouri,  Montana,  New  Mexico,  Pennsylvania. 
Source:  FFIEC,  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income.”  1993  data  are  preliminary However,  Charts  XI%,  XUIb, and XI&  also  contain  information  on the pattern  of bank 
holding  company  reliance  on multiple  banks  operating  in a given branching  environment. 
Because those  numbers  in all three types  of states are swamped by the  one-bank  numbers  a 
separate focus on multi-bank  patterns  is given  in Chart XIV. 
The patterns  shown  in Chart XIV are consistent  with expectations.  In the  case of 
states with  a long-standing  tradition  of  liberalized  branching,  the number  of MBCs remained 
basically  flat  over the period.  The states which  maintained  significant  restrictions  on  intra- 
state branching,  and those  states  liberalizing  branching  laws over the  1985-1988 period  both 
show significant  increases  in the  first half  of the  1980s in the number  of banking  companies 
operating  multiple  banks  within  a given  state’s borders.  Subsequently,  however,  the number 
of MBCs dropped  sharply  in states liberalizing  their  branching  laws, while  the number  of 
MBCs remained  basically  flat  in non-liberalizing  states. 
Another  way to calculate  the response  of banking  companies  to a change  in the 
opportunity  to alter their  corporate  organization  is to look  at the number,  and assets,  of multi- 
bank companies  relative  to one-bank  companies.  Charts XVa and XVb show,  respectively, 
the ratio  of the number  of MBCs to OBCs,  and assets in MBCs to assets  in OBCs.  The 
patterns  are basically  consistent  with the hypothesis  that,  given the opportunity,  banking 
companies  will  chose to centralize  their  network  of banks.  Chart XVa reveals  that  the 
relative  number  of banks  choosing  to operate  multiple  banks  in a state with  liberal  branching 
laws declined  over the  1980- 1993 period.  By contrast,  in those states which  maintained 
si_gnificant restrictions  on branching  throughout  most of the period,  the relative  number  of 
30 Chart  XIV:  BHCs  with  Multiple  Banks,  by  Type  of  State  Group  1 
m  State-Wide  Branching  States 
f  Restricted  Branching  States 
0: 
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81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
Number  of  Bank  Holding  Companies  Operating  Two  or  More  Banks  in  a  State,  by  Type  of  State  Group 
1980  1981  1982  1983 1984 1985 I$!?%  1987 1988 1989 1_990  1991 1.992  1993 
Pre-1980  State-Wide  Branching  States 
38  40  47  47  57  61  62  66  66  64  69  64  50  48 
States  Liberalizing  Branching  Laws  in  1985-1988 
126  134  149  190  255  300  314  309  297  274  260  239  221  196 
States  with  Restricted  Branching  Until  at  least  1990 
83  89  128  186  256  312  340  353  349  361  363  344  330  333 
States  with  statewide  branching  prior  to  1980:  Alaska,  Arizona,  California.  the  District  of  Columbia.  Delaware, 
Idaho,  Maryland,  Maine,  North  Carolina,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  Nevada,  Rhode  Island,  South  Carolina.  South 
Dakota,  Vermont.  States  liberalizing  branching  laws  in  1985-1988:  Florida,  Hawaii,  Nebraska,  Oregon. 
Washington,  Louisiana,  Michigan,  New  Hampshire,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  Texas,  Virginia,  West  Virgrnra, 
Wyoming.  States  with  restricted  branching  until  at  least  1990:  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Issinois,  Iowa.  Kentucky. 
Mississippi,  Missouri,  Montana,  New  Mexico,  Pennsylvania. 
Source:  FFIEC,  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income.”  1993  data  are  preliminary 
31 j   iChart  XVa:   MBC-to-OBC,  by Type of State
__---.
n St-Wide Brnchng States
o States Liberalizing ‘85’88
A Restricted Brnchng States
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Pre-1980 State-Wide Branching States
MBCIOBC: Cos. 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.13
MBC/OBC: Assets 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.72
States Liberalizing Branching Laws in 1985-1988
MBUOBC:Cos. 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.16
MBCIOBC: Assets 2.09 1.63 1.86 2.02 2.16
States with Restricted Branching Until  at.least  1990
MBC/OBC: Cos. 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.16
MBCIOBC: Assets 0.28 0.27 0.66 1.46 2.21
IChart   XVb:  Assets, MBC-to-OBC, by Type of St
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
~---___ ..-~
0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09
0.66 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.58 0.88 0.91 0.63 0.57
0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13
2.18 2.01 0.61’ 1.28 0.80 0.85 0.88 0.62 0.72
0.20 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21
2.57 3.13 3.21 2.41 2.46 2.59 1.81 1.65 1.49
OBCs Bank holding companies operating a single bank in a given state;  MBCs:  Bank holding companies operating multiple banks in a given st
Source  f-FIEC,  “Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income  ”  1993 data are preliminary.companies  choosing  a multi-bank  form  increased.  In addition,  in those  state which  liberalized 
branching  laws midway  through  the period,  the relative  number  of multi-bank  companies  fmt 
rose (a pattern  consistent  with  banking  companies  positioning  themselves  to consolidate 
acquisitions  after  liberalized  branching  laws would  have  been enacted), then  dropped  off  as 
greater opportunity  for consolidating  banking  networks  within  a given  “liberalizing”  state 
arose. 
On the  asset side, the thrust  of the results  is similar,  though  at least one anomaly 
presents  itself  In line  with  expectations,  the relative  importance  of multi-bank  companies.  as 
measured by assets, remains  roughly  flat  (though there  was a jump  up in  1990-1991).  At the 
same time,  for those  states relaxing  branching  restrictions  in the mid-1980s  the relative 
importance  of h4BCs declined  significantly  as, and after, branching  laws were  liberalized. 
Finally,  in those  states retaining  branching  restrictions  until  at least  1990, the relative 
importance  of multi-bank  companies  increased  through  the  first half  a the period.  However. 
the sharp drop which  occurred  in the relative  importance  of multi-bank  companies  thereafter 
is not necessarily  consistent  with  our expectations. 
Additional  perspective  on choice  of corporate  organization  is provided  in Chart  XVI. 
which  illustrates  changes  in the number  of banks per multiple-bank  company  in the three 
groups of states.  As anticipated  in those  states with  a tradition  of liberahzed  branching,  the 
number  of banks per multi-bank  company  declined  over the period  a result  consistent  with 
the expectation  that  companies  will  take  advantage  of opportunities  to centralize  operations. 
However.  there was also  a downward  trend  in the number  of banks per MBC  in both  of the 
other hvo  groups of states.  While  such a decline  after the mid-80s  could be expected  for 
33 l State-Wide  Branching  States 
u States  Liberalizing  Branching  in  ‘85’88 
A Restricted  Branching  States 
1~  _..-.  I___-L---l__.-L__.  _i___L  ~_L  ._~_L___.._L__L_L__L 
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93 
___~_  -____. 
Banks  per  Multi-Bank  Holding  Company,  by  Type  of  State  Group 
1980  Is!! 1382 m33  1984 1985 1986 I_981  1988 1989 mK!  1991 1992 1993 
Pre-1980  State-Wide  Branching  States 
Banks/Co  4.4  4.4  4.0  3.8  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.9 
States  Liberalizing  Branching  Laws  in  19851988 
Banks/Co  7.5  7.5  7.5  6.7  5.7  5.2  5.1  4.6  3.9  3.5  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.5 
States  with  Restricted  Branching  Uitil  at  least  1990 
Banks/Co  6.8  7.1  6.1  5.3  4.7  4.3  4.2  4.1  4.1  4.0  3.9  3.8  3.7  3.7 
Source:  FFIEC,  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income.”  1993  data  are  preliminary. those  state  liberalizing  branching  laws during the  1985-1988 period,  the  sharpest  drop  in 
banks per MBC  came  in the  early  1980s.  Furthermore,  even  in those  states which  did not 
liberalize  branching  laws, or did not  do so until  after  1989, the number  of banks  per MBC 
declined  substantially,  especially  in the early  part of the period.  This  could  be viewed  as 
evidence  that  multi-bank  companies  sought  to centralize  operations  even  in the  face. of 
branching  restrictions. 
Banking  company  structure has changed  substantially  over the past decade  and  a half. 
Much of the  data reviewed  above  is consistent  with  the hypothesis  that,  in their  search  for 
improved  efGencies,  banking  companies  have  generally  chosen  to consolidate  their  banking 
networks.  In addition,  the  analysis  presents  evidence  that that  strategy  is manifested  most 
strongly  in states where  geographic  restrictions  on banking  have  been reduced.  However,  the 
plunge  in the number  of independent  banks  remains  unexplained,  as does the rise  in the 
number of one-bank  holding  companies,  and the  increase  in the number  of banking  companies 
operating  a single  bank  in a given  state regardless  of the status of branching  laws.22 
Furthermore,  this  study presents  only  cimstmtial  evidence  on these  issues.  Though 
suggestive,  its real virtue  is to identify  trends,  the meaning  of which  may  become  apparent 
only  after the  application  of more  sophisticated  analysis.  Rather  than  pursue  that  course,  this 
article poses  one  more question:  on present  trends,  what would  the  future  structure  of banking 
look  like? 
”  But see footnote  2 1 on the Huggins ( 1986) piece. 
35 IV.  l?utme  Se-  of the  Banking  I&s@ 
If past  structural  changes persisted  through  the end of this  decade, what  would  the 
structure  of the banking  industry  be at the beginning  of the year  2001? Using  a simple 
approach,  this  section  addresses that  question.  Ihe  point,  it should  be rnade clear,  is not  to 
predict  future  structure;  rather,  it is to provide  a basis  for discussion  of why  we would  or 
would  not  expect  current trends to persist,  and to encourage  thinking  on what  “environmental 
jolts”  might  loom  on the horizon.  As a first order of business,  the possible  impact  of the 
enactment  of  interstate  branch  banking  is considered  Ihat  is followed  by  a “judgmentally 
adjusted  extrapolation”  of past changes  in banking  structure,  and a discussion  of what 
underlies  such  an exercise. 
W.A.  Itierxtate  Bmnding  - Hjpothetical  Impact 
At the time  of this  article  was written,  the Congressional  passage  of  interstate 
branching  legislation  seemed highly  likely.”  There is little  guidance  in the  banking  literature 
on what the  structure  of the  industry  would  be in the event  interstate  branching  were  enacted; 
in the absence  of such guidance,  a simple  thought  exercise yields  information  on  some of the 
possible  dimensions  of the  legislation.  Essentially,  interstate  branch  banking  legislation  would 
allow  a bank  to own and operate  a branch  in any state outside  its home  state.  The purchase 
of an existing  branch  might have  a subtle  change  on banking  structure, but the number  of 
institutions  would  not  change,  and we ignore  that possibility.  In addition,  for the purposes  of 
this particular  subsection,  the possibility  of an out-of-state  bank acquiring  a bank  in another 
23 See, e.g.,  The  Wd/  Skxt  hwmd,  “House Approves  Bill to Permit Interstate  Banks.”  March  13.  i  994. 
36 state, and subsequently  turning  it into a branch  of the parent  bank,  is also  ignored.24  Instead, 
the focus is on the possible  consolidation  of the  industry  that could  occur  if banking 
companies  in the position  to make an immediate  change  did so. 
Specifically,  a simple  calculation  was made of the maximum  possible  decrease  in the 
number of banks  that  could  occur if every  multi-state  multi-bank  holding  company  merged  all 
of its out-of-state  subsidiaries  banks  into branches  of the  lead bank  in the home  state.  Under 
those  conditions,  as the  map and accompanying  chart on  the next page  make  clear,  there 
would  be  1,234 fewer banks  - a decline  of over eleven percent  in the  current  number  of 
commercial  banks.  The  impact would  be spread quite differently  across  states,  however. 
Nine  states (Arkansas,  Arizona,  Colorado,  Delaware,  Idaho,  Indiana,  Maryland  New Mexico. 
and Rhode Island)  and the  District  of Columbia  would  lose more than  one-quarter  of their 
banks.  However,  twenty  states would  lose fewer than ten percent  of their  banks,  and the 
remaining  twenty-one  would  lose between  ten and twenty-five  percent. 
It should  be stressed that the above  exercise  is not a forecast  or projection.  In 
particular,  the analysis  in the previous  section  clearly  showed that,  despite  a trend  toward 
centralization,  some banking  companies  have  chosen  to retain  multiple  subsidiaries,  even  in 
states with  a long-standing  tradition  of statewide  branching.  Hence,  it is reasonabie  to expect 
that even upon the  enactment  of interstate  branching,  some multi-state  multi-bank  holding 
companies  will  choose  to retain  a number  of separately  chartered banks  in different  states. 
Nevertheless,  evidence  on how banking  companies  have reacted to the possibility  of  intra- 
state branching  shows that  many  banks are likely  to pursue the opportunities  to  consolidate 
”  That possibility  is considered  in the ne?ct section. 
37 Interstate  Branching:  Hypothetical  Impact 
% decrease  in  number  of  banks 
E  Under  10% 
Decrease  in  number  of  commercial  banks,  by  state* 
State  Number  Percent 
ALL  1,234  11.3 
AL  37  17.3 
AU  3  37.5 
AZ  14  37.8 
AR  21  8.2 
CA  10  2.6 
co  82  25.9 
CT  5  10.9 
DE  18  56.3 
DC  6  31.6 
FL  77  20.2 
GA  48  12.1 
HI  1  12.5 
IA  31  5.8 
ID  8  38.1 
IL  88  9.2 
IN  62  26.3 
State  Number  Percent 
KS  32  6.5 
KY  35  11.3 
LA  3  1.4 
ME  4  19.0 
MD  26  28.0 
MA  9  15.0 
MI  36  17.3 
MN  44  7.7 
MS  4  3.4 
MO  76  15.5 
MT  9  7.7 
NE  21  5.8 
NV  5  25.0 
NH  1  4.5 
NJ  11  11.2 
NM  28  34.6 
NY  11  6.3 
NC  4  5.7 
State  Number  Percent 
ND  10  7.1 
OH  45  7.1 
OK  IO  2.7 
OR  7  15.6 
PA  18  6.9 
RI  2  28.6 
SC  9  11.5 
SD  13  10.8 
TN  41  15.5 
TX  30  3.0 
UT  4  12.1 
VA  29  17.6 
vr  1  5.0 
WA  6  6.8 
WV  39  2.6 
WI  88  20.2 
WY  10  18.2 
TR*  2  12.5 
*  Change  In  the  numDer  of  banks,  if  each  multi-state  bank  holding  company  turned  all  of  its  subsidianes  Into  branches 
of  I&  lead  bank  and  no  other  consolidation  occurred.  TR  =  U.S.  territories.  Base  penod  IS  year-end  1993 
Source:  FFIEC  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income”;  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  staff  estimates 
38 across state  lines that  the enactment  of  intastate  branching  would  provide.  With  this  in mind 
attention  is turned  to a hypothetical  look  at the future. 
W.B.  The Banking  hdmty  in 2OOI? 
As  section  III.B  showed,  the patterns  of structural  changes  at the banking  company 
level  are complex,  making  even  an extrapolation  (as compared  to a projection  or forecast)  of 
the changes  difficult.  As an alternative,  this  section  focuses on extrapolating  changes  in the 
number  of banks,  the  implicit  reasoning  being that changes  in banking  company  structure 
manifest  themselves,  in a proximate  sense, as changes  in the number  of banks.z  The 
procedure  followed  in this  section  is straightiorward  (details  are contained  in Appendix  2). 
Using  data on the pattern  of mergers,  failures,  and entry  on a state-by-state  basis  over the 
seven year period  1987-1993, two  state-by-state  “extrapolations”  of the  future number  of 
banks were  calculated,  to yield  the  cumulative  amount and type  of consolidation  over the  next 
seven years,  through  the end of the year  2000.  By design, the procedure  is essentially 
mechanical  in nature,  though judgmental  adjustments  were made  in several  ways,  two of 
which  apply  to both the  “non-intexxtate branching”  and the  “inferState branching”  scenarios. 
First,  it was assumed that  extrapolating  the pattern  of bank failures  over the  1992-1993 
period,  rather  than  the entire  1987-1993 period,  would provide  a more useful  set of results  to 
consider.  In addition,  working  from the  observation  that entry  has slowed tremendously  over 
25 Miller (1988)  and Hannan and Rhoades  (1992) provide  two different  analytic  approaches  to project  future 
bank structure.  For a projection  methodology  that starts from a similar point as the ez;Trapolations in this study. 
but that  includes  as well projections  of the number  of bank holding companies,  see Nisenson  (1991).  Rhoades 
(1992) considers  the hypothetical  case of all mergers  allowable under the Justice  Department  guidelines  being 
consummated. the recent  past,  it was decided  that  entry  over the remainder  of the  decade would  be 
calculated  at one-third  the  1987- 1993 pace. 
Because  there  is no direct  guidance  from past data on the  impact  of interstate 
branching  on consolidation,  a judgment  call was also made for the  “interstate  branching” 
scenario.  In particular,  a higher  rate of within-holding  company  mergers was calculated  as 
multi-state  multi-bank  companies  take  advantage  of the opportunity  to turn out-of-state  subs 
into branches  of the  lead bank  in the  organization,  and as one-state  multi-bank  holding 
companies  engage  in some  degree  of  “competitive”  consolidation  of subsidiaries. 
Furthermore,  a higher  rate of mergers  between  unafliliated  banks  was used in the  interstate 
branching  scenario,  reflecting  the possibility  that banks will  acquire  other banks  across state 
borders  in order subsequently  to be able to  “branch” the cross-border  sub into the  lead bank 
in the home  state.% 
The results  of these  “thought  exercises”  are presented  in Charts  XV@  XVIIb:  and 
XVIII.  Chart  XVIIa  illustrates  the  composition  of consolidation  under the assumption  that 
there  is no  interstate  branching  legislation  enacted.  The decrease  of just  under  2,100 banks 
extrapolated  for the period  1994-2000 is about two-thirds  of the  amount  of consolidation  that 
occurred  over  1987- 1993.  By assumption,  the  extrapolation  yields  large differences  in the 
number  of failures  and new charters  compared  to the  1987-1993 actuals.  However,  the net 
differences  between  failures  and entry  for the  extrapolation  period  compared  to the  1987- 1993 
period  are similar  -  a net addition  of  116 banks (extrapolation),  and  167 banks  (1987-1993). 
26 7his  possibili?  has been commented  on in the business press.  See, e.g..  Tk  F’nll So-m  hro7d.  “Banh~ 
Bracing  for the Removal  of Interstate  Barriers,”  March  i 1. 1994. 
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Number of Commercial Banks: Actual and Hypothetical
1980 1985 1989 Ils!xp-   2000  E 2000 IS
14,429 14,25512,54710,870 8,808 7,796
2000 E: Extrapolation under the assumption that interstate branching does not apply. 2000 IS: Extra-
polation under the assumption that full interstate bank and branching become effective in  7996.
Source: FFIEC. “Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income”; Federal Reserve, IMS Structure File,
OCC staff extrapolations. The extrapolations were based on  IMS  Structure File data. See Appendix 1
for a discussion on the issue of matching Structure File and Reports of Condition  ana  Income data.12.5  t 
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1980  1985  1989  1993 
Number  of  Commercial  Banks:  Actual  and  Hypothetical 
l!B!J  1985  1989  1993-_  2000  E  2000  IS 
14,429  14,255  12,547  10,870 8,808  7,796 
2000  E:  Extrapolation  under  the  assumption  that  interstate  branching  does  not  apply.  2000  IS:  Extra- 
polation  under  the  assumption  that  full  interstate  bank  and  branching  become  effective  in  1996. 
Source:  FFIEC.  “Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income”;  Federal  Reserve,  IMS  Structure  File, 
OCC staff  extrapolations.  The  extrapolations  were  based  on  IMS  Structure  File  data.  See  Appendix  7 
for  a  discussion  on  the  issue  of  matching  Structure  File  and  Reports  of  Condition  ana  Income  data. 
42 Hence,  most  of the  diffkrence  between  the actual  consolidation  over  1987-1993, and the 
hypothetical  consolidation  over  MM-2000  is due to mergers.  ‘That is, if ink-a-mergexx and 
inter-merge  were to proceed  over  1994-2000 at the same pace as was the case for the  1987- 
1993, nddve  to the number  of banks  in existence  at the beginning  of the period,  total 
consolidation  of the  industry  would  be about twc&irds  of the amount  achieved  over  the  past 
seven years. 
An  “extrapolation”  was also made which  incorporates  the hypothetical  impact  of the 
enactment  of interstate  branching  legislation.  Specifically,  it was assumed that:  1) interstate 
branching  legislation  is passed  at the  federal  level  in  1994; 2) as an interim  phase,  till, 
nationwide  interstate  banking  becomes  possible  at the beginning  of  1995; 3) full  interstate 
branching  becomes  possible  at the beginning  of  1996; and 4) no states  subsequently  choose  to 
“opt out” of -  i.e., disallow  at the  state  level  -  either  interstate  banking  or interstate 
branching  provisions.  In addition,  it was assumed that the multi-state  multi-bank  holding 
companies  in existence  at the end of  1993 are still  in existence  at the  beginning  of  1996 when 
interstate  branching  takes effect,  and that  as a group they  “branch up” seventy-five  percent  of 
their  out-of-home-state  subs by year-end  2000.27 
Chart  XVIIb  illustrates  the result  of this procedure.  No  impact  of inter&k  branching 
on failures  or entry was calculated,  though  the geographic  diversification  of risk,  which  has 
been  cited  as a virtue  of interstate  branching,  might  be expected  to reduce failures  somewhat: 
27 ‘Ihe assumption  that the number of multi-state  multi-bank holding  companies  grows  no biger  or smaller 
than those  in existence  at the end of  1993, while  probably  unrealistic,  is not as strong as it might  first appear  for 
the sake of calculating  consolidation.  That  is, if tw  MSMBHCs merged,  and prior to the merger  both  were  bent 
on completely  “consolidating  up” their  subs into branches of the  lead bank in the home  state. the total  additionai 
possible  “interstate consolidation”  is one bank --  i.e.. the iead bank in the acquired  MSMBHC. 
43 and entry  of full-service  banks  might  be expected to be lower than  it otherwise  would  be, due 
to the entry  of new branches.  Hence,  by assumption,  the  difference  between  the  two 
scenarios  is due to mergers.  Intra-mergers  in the interstate  branching  scenario  are up by more 
than  500 over the non-interstate  extrapolation,  due to faster consolidation  within  state borders 
by multi-bank  companies,  and by  MSMBHCs  merging  out-of-state  subs into their  lead banks. 
Specifically,  it was assumed that  seventy-five  percent  of the 367 possible  “interstate  intra- 
mergers” that  existed at year-end  1993 would  be consummated  by year-end  2000. 
Inter-mergers  were assumed  to  increase by half  over the non-interstate  extrapolation  of 
past patterns,  as more banks  seek to position  themselves  to take  advantage  of  interstate 
branching.  Hence, the total  additional  impact on consolidation  of the enactment  of  interstate 
branching  is calculated  to be about  1000 more banks.  Chart  XVIII  shows the result  of the 
extrapolation  exercises  in terms  of numbers  of banks  in existence  by the year  200 1. 
How realistic  are these  outcomes?  The concluding  section  addresses that  question  in 
light  of what  we know,  and of what  we need yet to discover,  about past  structural  changes  in 
the banking  industry. 
V.  Clmlusions 
The main  stimuli  for structural  change  in the banking  industry  seem likely  to persist 
over the remainder  of this  decade.  In particular,  increased  competition  and the  expansion  of 
geographic  powers are certain  to effect  structural  decisions  made by bankers,  Among  the 
most  important  of those  actions  will  be mergers between  unaffiliated  banks,  and continued 
within-holding  company 
activity  there  will  be, or 
consolidation.  It is difficult  to  guess at how  much  “inter-merger” 
at what  pace those  mergers will  take place.  It seems safe to assume. 
44 however,  that  in the event  interstate  branching  legislation  is passed  inter-merger  activity  over 
the next  seven  years will  exceed  its pace  of the previous  seven years.  The hypothetical 
pattern  of inter-mergers  in the extrapolations  does not, therefore,  seem unreasonable. 
The pattern  of within-holding  company  consolidation  is a complex  subject,  as the 
review  of past  structuml  changes  revealed.  Qrtainly,  there  is a tendency  toward  greater 
centralization,  as shown by the decline  in the number of banks  per multi-bank  holding 
company,  and as manifested  in the relative  trend toward one-bank  versus  multi-bank  company 
structure  in states which  have  liberalized  their branching  laws.  Still,  the nature  and scope  of 
the performance  gains associated  with  a particular  type  of change  in corporate  organization 
bear more  investigation.  Though  the  extrapolations  of within-holding  company  consolidation 
seem too  low,  it is difficult  to  guess at what the actual magnitude  of this  aspect of 
consolidation  will  be. 
Other  aspects of structural  change,  actual or potential,  that warrant  further research  are 
the huge  drop  in the number  of independent  banks, and the possible  impact  of interstate 
banking  and branching  on failures  and entry.  Beyond  this,  an explicit  account  of the 
structural  impacts  of competitive  pressures  from nonbank  financial  intermediaries  is crucial  to 
a comprehensive  understanding  of past  changes  in the banking  industry.  As well,  the nature 
of the  linkages  between  “environmental  jolts”  to the industry,  and structural  change  need  to be 
made transparent. 
It seems quite  likely  that  under  any circumstances  there  will  still  be thousands  of 
banks,  and thousands  of bank holding  companies,  in existence  as the next  century  dawns.  Far 
fewer of these  banks  will  bc small,  independent  institutions,  but the role  of  independent  banks in closely  monitoring  credit allocation  at the local,  community  level  will  be carried  on by 
subunits  of bank  holding  companies.  ‘Ihe ways  in which  the changes  outlined  above  have 
effected,  and will  effect, banking  industry  pe~%ormance  is beyond  the  scope  of this  article. 
Surely,  though,  the effort to understand  structural  change  is a key  to component  to an 
intelligent  discussion  of what  banks  will  and/or  should  do. 
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48 Appendix1:Datalssues 
Ibis  article  uses data f?om the  “Consolidated  Reports  of Condition  and Income”  (Tall 
I 
Reports”)  compiled  by the  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examkation  Council  (FFIEC)  for 
i 
structure  and performance  data on extant  banks.  Unless  otherwise  noted  “Consolidated 
i 
Reports  of Condition  and Income”  or “Call Report” refers to the FFIEC 03 1, 032, 033, and 
034 reports.  In the  current  study  a “bank” is defined  as any FDIC-insured  commercial  bank 
i 
with  positive  assets at the time  of filing  the Call, a definition  that  generally  excludes 
industrial  banks,  savings  banks,  trust companies  without  deposits,  uninsured  banks,  a small 
number  of banks with  no  assets and, except where noted,  U.S. branches  and agencies  of 
foreign  banks.  Some, or all,  of these  exclusions  may  be included  in other  studies.  Hence,  the 
aggregate  figures  in this  study  for banks, branches,  and bank  holding  companies  may  be 
slightly  srnaller than  those  reported  elsewhere. 
The Call  Report  does not  carry data on how banks entered  or disappeared  from  the  system 
i.e., how the banking  industry  actually  consolidated.  For direct  information  on  consolidation 
this paper  follows  Nisenson  (1991) in using the IMS Structure File  data base compiled  by the 
Federal  Reserve  Board.  Use of that  data source makes possible  a detailed  decomposition  of 
consolidation  of the  industry,  on a bank-by-bank  basis.  The MS  Structure File,  which  is 
compiled  on essentially  a “real time” basis, rather than  quarterly  as is the  case with  the  Call 
Reports,  does not  contain  any  financial  data on banks,  but deals with the same universe  of 
banks  as file the  Call  Reports.  However,  for a given  set of criteria  on what  constitutes  a 
“bank”, the  Structure  File  generally  includes  a few more banks than the Call  Reports, 
presumably  because  the  Structure File  includes  some banks that  did not file  a Call  in the 
quarter they  disappeared. 
49 Appendix 2: Extmpolation  lb%Abdolog38 
Four components  of banking  industry  consolidation  over the  1987-1993 period  --  intra- 
mergers (within  holding  company  mergers),  inter-mergers  (mergers between  unaffiliated 
banks),  failures,  and entry  -  were  extrapolated  through  year-end  2000, on a state-by-state 
basis.  (Appendix  Table  1 shows  the  state-by-state  decomposition  of consolidation;  notes  to 
that table  give the definitions  of the  components,  which  essentially  are bank  charter 
disappeamnces  or appearances.)  Two  scenarios  were considered:  extrapolation  of past trends 
under the  assumption  that  legislation  allowing  nationwide  interstate  branching  is not  enacted, 
and a “judgmental  adjustment”  of that  extrapolation  under the assumption  that  interstate 
branching  legislation  is passed  in  1994 and fully  enacted by  1996. 
For both scenarios,  the extrapolation  of past trends  for failures  and entry  focused  on the  1992- 
1993 period.  For failures,  the  extrapolation  was: 
FALLS = FAIL  FACTOR  * NPRBANKS93 
where FALLS is the  cumulative  number  of failures  over the  1994-2000 period;  FALL 
FACTOR  is the ratio  of banks  that failed  in  1992 and  1993 to the number  of banks 
with  a nonperforming  ratio  of  greater than  or equal to  100% at year-end  1991 
(multiplied  by  7/2 to extrapolate  the trend of the two year period  1992- 1993 over the 
seven year period  1994-2000); NPRBANKS93  is the number  of banks  at the  end of 
1993 that had a ratio  of nonperforming  assets to primary  capital  of greater  than  or 
equal to  100 percent.  (Nonperforming  assets include  the sum of loans  and  leases 90 
days or more past  due, plus  nonaccrual  loans, plus  other real estate owned  primary 
capital  includes  equity  capital,  plus  allowance  for loan and  lease losses, plus  minority 
interest  in consolidated  subsidiaries,  plus total  mandatory  convertible  debt.)  Failures 
for  199  l- 1993 did not  include  assisted transactions. 
Entry  was calculated  as: 
ENTRY = ENTRY  SHARE  * ENTRY FACTOR  * NOBANKS 
where ENTRY  is the  cumulative  number of new charters  over the  1994-2000 period; 
ENTRY  SHARE is the ratio  of de xwos  and thrift  conversions  over the  1987-1993 
period  to the number  of banks  that  existed at year-end  1986; ENTRY  FACTOR  by 
assumption,  is one-third  the pace  of entry  over the  1987-1993 period;  NOBANKS  is 
the number  of banks  at the  end of  1993. 
?his  methodology  is based closely  on previous  work by Nisenson  (199  1). 
50 For the “non-inkstate”  scenario, i&a-mergers were calculated as: 
INTRAS = INTRA FACTOR * INTRAPO93 
where INTRAS is the cumulative number of intra-mergers over the 1994-2000  period; 
INTRA FACTOR is placed at .62 -  the ratio of total intra-mergers over the 1987- 
1993 period to the total possible number of within holding company mergers at year- 
end 1986; INTRAPO93 is the number of within holding company mergers that could 
take place if every MBHC collapsed all of its subs, in a given state, into branches of 
its “lead” (i.e., largest) bank in that state.  (That is essentially the scenario of complete 
intra-state branching). 
Inter-mergexs  were calculated as: 
INTERS = INTER FACTOR * INTER SHARE * NOBANKS 
where IIVIERS is the cumulative number of inter-mergers over the 1994-2000  period; 
INTER FACTOR is placed at 1.00 -  i.e., the pace of inter-mergers  over the 1987- 
1993 period is assumed to apply for the extrapolation period; INTER SHARE is the 
ratio of inter-mergers over 1987-1993  to the number of banks at year-end 1986; and 
NOBANKS  is the number of banks at year-end 1993. 
For the “interstate branching” scenario, failures and entry were estimated as above, and inter- 
mergers were assumed to proceed at 1.5 times the 1987-1993  rate, as banks under take to 
position themselves to take advantage of interstate branching.  Intra-mergers  were calculated 
in two parts, INTRAS and ISBR  INlXAS was calculated as above, except that INTRA 
FACTOR was raised to .75, under the assumption that with interstate branching enacted, 
multistate  multi-bank holding companies (MSMBHCs)  will increase the rate at which they 
consolidate their subsidiaries within a given state, and one-state multi-bank holding companies 
will engage in “competitive consolidation” of their subsidiaries at a faster rate than in the 
“non-interstate”  scenario.  MSMBHCs will also, under interstate branching, be able to “branch 
up” subs across state lines.  Hence, an additional component of within holding company 
consolidation -  ISBR -  was calculated as:  .  . 
ISBR = ISBR FACTOR * ISBRP093 
where ISBR FACTOR is set at .75, under the assumption that 75 percent of the 
possible within-company, cross-border mergers of subsidiaries into the lead bank in the 
home state are consummated by year-end 2000; and ISBRP093 is the potential within- 
company, cross-border mergers for all MSMBHCs that existed at the end of 1993. 
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1987-1993  1987-1993 
CHANGE 




AK  15  2  2  5  2  -7  8 
AL  229  24  15  2  28  -15  214 
AR  256  5  5  3  13  1  257 
AZ  54  0.  11  16  12  -17  37 
CA  445  20  56  39  60  -56  369 
co  438  91  37  39  38  -122  316 
CT  60  10  5  20  25  -14  46 
DC  20  1  2  5  a  -1  19 
DE  34  6  4  1  16  -2  32 
FL  411  65  51  30  128  -29  382 
GA  369  52  24  2  105  30  399 
HI  10  5  0  1  0  -2  a 
IA  614  26  51  13  6  -04  530 
ID  24  0  7  0  4  -3  21 
IL  1219  222  82  a  50  -262  957 
IN  355  a7  29  6  7  -118  237 
KS  612  38  72  25  15  -122  490 
KY  331  23  16  2  20  -22  309 
LA  298  17  21  57  15  -ai  217 
MA  102  38  2  16  17  -42  60 
MD  91  13  4  2  18  2  93 
ME  22  3  2  1  7  -1  21 
MI  345  128  25  1  16  -137  208 
MN  727  107  48  20  16  -159  568 
MO  610  91  40  15  27  -120  490 
MS  141  3  20  2  3  -22  119 
MT  169  43  a  7  9  -52  117 
NC  64  1  17  2  29  6  70 
ND  176  24  16  a  3  -35  141 
NE  430  23  44  a  15  -70  360 
NH  53  14  0  9  7  -31  22 
NJ  117  36  13  10  39  -19  98 
NM  94  7  3  5  2  -13  81 
NV  16  0  2  0  6  4  20 
NY  195  24  11  11  27  -19  176 
OH  304  40  20  4  22  41  263 
OK  519  27  56  79  12  -148  371 
OR  59  2  11  1  5  -14  45 
PA  302  46  31  2  37  40  262 
RI  14  1  2  1  1  -7  7 
SC  73  4  7  1  18  6  70 
SD  134  a  9  3  9  -14  120 
TN  283  39  29  1  35  -34  249 
TX  1972  418  143  470  77  -961  1011 
UT  50  1  13  5  3  -17  33 
VA  171  15  12  6  28  -6  165 
vr  25  4  1  2  3  -5  20 
WA  94  4  23  2  26  -6  aa 
WI  566  108  36  0  15  -130  436 
WV  211  36  29  1  3  -63  148 
WY  106  40  7  5  1  -51  55 
USTERR  17  1  1  1  3  -1  16 
TOTAL  14046  2043  1175  975  1091  -3166  10880 
Intra-Merger:  disappearance  of  a  bank  charter  as  a  result  of  the  acquisition  of  one  bank  in  a  bank  holding  company  by 
another  bank  in  that  same  company.  Inter-Merger.  disappearance  of  a  banK  charter  as  a  result  of  the  acqulsitlon  of  a 
bank  by  another  bank  unaffiliated  with  It.  “Fails”.  commercial  banks  Insured  by  the  BIF  that  have  been  closed  by 
their  pnmary  regulator  Unlike  the  aggregate  numbers  In  the  charts  and  tables  I”  the  text,  state-by-state  figures 
for  “falls”  do  not  Include  assisted  transactions.  New  Charters  Include  conversions  of  thrifts  to  banks.  i990-7993 
Source  Federal  Reserve  Board  IMS  Structure  File 
51 Chart  Al  :  Commercial  Bank  Resolutions:  1981-1993 
By  Type  of  Resolution 
H  P&As 
0  Liquidations 
￿I  Other 
Total 
1981  1982  1983  1984  19~5  1986  1987  19aa  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
~Source:FederalDep~$lllnsuranu,CwporaUon  NewsReleasas,19alloPresent;WwofVleComplrolleroftheCurrency 
Type  of  Resolution  1981  1982  1983  1964  1985  1986  1987  190.5  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  ____ 
Purchase&Assumptions  5  27  36  63  07  97  132  124  170  141  82  52  33 
Liquidations  2  7  9  4  22  21  11  6  10  a  4  10  5 
Other  0  0  0  12  9  25  58  91  26  10  22  39  3 
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